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ANTITRUST FOR THE MODERN ERA
Ittai Paldor1†

Antitrust law is ill-adapted to perform its modern role, which includes
securing competition in the digital-economy arena and enforcement
measures against tech-giants and online platforms. Recent academic
writings have consequently called for radical changes in antitrust law.
Some have argued that the remedies currently available under antitrust
law are insufficient, and others have even contended that new approaches to antitrust law’s traditional goals are mandated. This Article
suggests that such profound changes are, for the most part, unnecessary.
The Article suggests an alternative measure. Specifically, it suggests that
much can be achieved by updating antitrust law’s starting point—market definition. Adopting this new starting point requires no legislative
amendments or major shifts in the fundamental understanding of antitrust law. It can be done within existing frameworks and doctrines.
The alternative starting point suggested in this Article carries three main
benefits. First, it allows antitrust law to be readily applied in areas in
which it is currently failing. Second, it allows market definition—the
cornerstone of most antitrust analyses—to overcome a major theoretical
problem associated with it. Finally, it overcomes the practical shortcomings of the traditional starting point. Thus, the proposal in this Article
not only adjusts antitrust law to modern markets, but also streamlines
its application in traditional markets.
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent decision, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed a lawsuit brought against Facebook by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC).2 The FTC’s argument that Facebook holds
a dominant share of the market, in excess of 60%, and that it therefore has a dominant position, was found to be an unsupported assertion.3 This assertion, the court found, could not survive in the Personal
Social Networking services market, which is “an unusual, nonintuitive
product market.”4
This decision may appear odd. It would seem self-evident that
Facebook has a large market share, and that it holds a dominant position by any reasonable interpretation of the term “dominant position.” But whether or not the court was correct on the substantive
issue, it was justified in insisting on a rigorous process to establish
something that is intuitively clear. Antitrust law demands that markets
be defined as a starting point for virtually all antitrust inquiries.5
The need for the methodology stems from the fact that substitutability is a matter of degree. Every product has numerous substitutes, each exerting a different degree of competitive pressure on the
seller or sellers of the product on which the analysis is focused. Mere
2. FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2021). On the same date, the court also
dismissed a parallel claim filed against Facebook by several states in New York v. Facebook, Inc.,
549 F. Supp. 3d 6, 14 (D.D.C. 2021). The states’ claim was dismissed for laches and is therefore
immaterial to the argument pressed in this Article. Id.
3. FTC, 560 F. Supp. 3d at 2.
4. Id.
5. See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Hidden Rules of a Modest Antitrust, 105 MINN. L. REV. 2095,
2098–2101, 2107 (2021) (explaining that per se illegality currently applies only to horizontal price
fixing and surveying a host of practices which were previously subject to a per se illegality rule).
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intuition may be either over- or under- inclusive. Competitive analyses must thus begin with an accurate assessment of the degree of substitutability between the product in question and its different
substitutes. The “market” is, in essence, the group of close substitutes
that exert immediate competitive pressure on a product. Market definition is the methodology that has been adopted across the globe as
the standard starting point for nearly all antitrust inquiries.6
However, the methodology suffers from two major flaws. The first
flaw is a practical one. The methodology is extremely difficult to employ. The reason is that the methodology essentially attempts to answer a hypothetical question: how many consumers will turn to
substitutes if the price of the product is increased slightly? If many
consumers will discontinue purchases, other products are obviously
close substitutes for the product in question.7 Thus, the core element
of the process is an attempt to gauge consumers’ hypothetical response to a hypothetical increase in the price of the product of interest. Because the process requires hypothesizing about a host of issues,
it is a cumbersome economic exercise, and is ultimately an extremely
costly method that results in little more than a guess.
In recent years the practical issues associated with the methodology
have become a major impediment to the efficacy of antitrust law due
to the constantly-growing role of the digital economy in the commercial world, and the rise of tech-giants and online platforms.8 In order
to prevail in an antitrust case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that competition in a specific market or in specific markets has been (or is
likely to be) harmed.9 The murkiness of the methodology and the unpredictability of the outcome allow for disparate market definitions
that are all plausible, or at least possible.10 This makes the outcome of
an antitrust challenge uncertain. At the same time, the complexity of
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. See infra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.
8. See Gregory Day & Abbey Stemler, Are Dark Patterns Anticompetitive?, 72 ALA. L. REV.
1, 8 (2020) (“With a combined market capitalization of $5.9 trillion, companies relying on platform technology lie at the heart of the modern economy.”).
9. FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d 1, 19–21 (D.D.C. 2021); United States v. AT&T Inc.,
916 F.3d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2019); see U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Mission (July 20, 2015), https://
www.justice.gov/atr/mission; Rebecca Klar, Independent Business Groups Push Biden Against
FTC, DOJ Appointees with Ties to Big Tech, THE HILL (Feb. 4, 2021), https://thehill.com/policy/
technology/537222-independent-business-groups-push-biden-against-ftc-doj-nominees-with-ties.
10. See Benedict Evans, What’s Amazon’s Market Share?, BEN-EVANS.COM (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2019/12/amazons-market-share19 (raising the question of whether Amazon’s market share is 5% or 35%); Kevin Indig, How Big Is Google’s Market Share Really?, KEVIN-INDG.COM (Nov. 15, 2020), https://www.kevin-indig.com/blog/how-bigis-googles-market-share-really/ (listing six major problems with identifying Google’s market
share and noting that these are applicable to other markets as well).
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the methodology makes any adversarial process extremely lengthy
and costly. These two features serve tech-giants well when combatting
their opponents in court. There is always a reasonable chance that the
powerful defendants will prevail, and the process can be expected to
drain their adversaries’ resources. One need only look at the lawsuits
launched against Microsoft at the turn of the millennium to be persuaded of this point. Numerous states and the federal government attempted to challenge Microsoft’s tying of its internet browser,
Internet Explorer, to its operating system.11 This tying practice jeopardized the viability of Microsoft’s competitor – Netscape. The various proceedings against Microsoft went on for nearly six years, the
equivalent of eternity in terms of a business’s life cycle.12 And even
then, the outcome was far from a governmental victory. In the courtroom, the lawsuit was settled.13 On the commercial battlefield, Netscape had by then been defeated.14
Private plaintiffs bringing antitrust suits against these tech-giants
are even less likely than the government to prevail. Often, they cannot
afford to litigate against these mammoths given the uncertainty of the
outcome and the unimaginable costs of a lawsuit that entails complex
economic issues.15
Another contemporary practical issue with the methodology is that
it is impossible to employ in digital markets. The methodology calls

11. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 39 (D.D.C. 2000); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 66–71 (D.D.C. 2000); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 64, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
12. For key developments see WIRED, U.S. v. Microsoft: Timeline (Nov. 4, 2002), https://
www.wired.com/2002/11/u-s-v-microsoft-timeline/ (dating the beginning of the relevant proceedings to October 27, 1997).
13. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation Information on the Settlement (Nov.
20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/usdoj-antitrust-division-us-v-microsoft-corporation-information-settlement#docs; see also Ina Fried, Court Upholds Microsoft-Justice Dept. Settlement,
CNET (July 1, 2004), https://www.cnet.com/news/court-upholds-microsoft-justice-dept-settlement/.
14. W. Joseph Campbell, The Rise and Fall of Netscape, THE BALT. SUN (Aug. 8, 2016), https:/
/www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-netscape-lessons-20160808-story.html.
15. Yotam Kaplan & Ittai Paldor, Social Justice and the Structure of the Litigation System, N.C.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 6–7), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4046524; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1785, 1785 (2001); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Empowering Individual Plaintiffs,
102 CORNELL L. REV. 1319, 1319, 1331 (2017); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1314–21 (2012); Judith Resnik, Diffusing
Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of
Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2826 (2015); F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort
Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 471–72 (2006) (in the specific context of tort law).
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for a hypothetical price increase of 5%.16 When consumers do not pay
for a product at all—as is often the case in digital markets and in online platforms—a hypothetical price increase of a certain percentage is
meaningless.17
In recent years, academics and others have forcefully argued that
antitrust law should be utilized to address the concentration of power
in the hands of very few tech-giants—chiefly Google, Amazon,
Facebook, and Apple.18 Regulators have been attentive to these calls,
and investigations and lawsuits have been launched by state attorneys
general, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the FTC against these
tech-giants.19 But as the example at the beginning of this Article demonstrates, these efforts have yet to bear fruit. Even the starting point
remains highly contestable.
As fatal as they are to antitrust law, the practical issues pale in comparison to a major theoretical problem. In an influential article published in 2010, Professor Kaplow showed that the methodology is
logically flawed.20 Due to an overlooked element, the process is in fact
a logical tautology (at best): it begins with an estimate of the degree of
market power, which is based on nothing more than intuition.21 And
the whole process can in fact do no more than bring the adjudicator
back to this initial estimation.22 The process offers a scientific guise—
but is the logical equivalent of alchemy.
16. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 10
(2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES].
17. John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Applications, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 49,
65 (2016).
18. See generally Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017)
(arguing that antitrust’s current framework is unequipped to capture the architecture of market
power in the modern economy and calling for a reorientation of antitrust’s traditional goals);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE L.J. 1952, 2001–39 (2021)
(discussing antitrust remedies against digital platforms). See also Day & Stemler, supra note 8, at
24 (arguing that antitrust law should be utilized to address digital manipulation).
19. See Tony Romm, The Justice Department Is Preparing a Potential Antitrust Investigation of
Google, WASH. POST (May 31, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/01/
justice-department-is-preparing-potential-antitrust-investigation-google/; Brian Fung, Facebook
Must Be Broken Up, the US Government Says in a Groundbreaking Lawsuit, CNN (Dec. 10,
2020), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/12/09/tech/facebook-antitrust-lawsuit-ftc-attorney-generals/
index.html; Brian Fung, The Antitrust Lawsuits Against Google Just Keep Coming, CNN (Dec.
17, 2020), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/12/17/tech/google-antitrust-lawsuit/index.html.
20. Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 515 (2010) [hereinafter Market Definition]; Louis Kaplow, Market Definition Alchemy, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 915, 951
(2012) [hereinafter Alchemy].
21. Kaplow, Market Definition, supra note 20, at 471.
22. Id.
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Consequently, as has been observed, “the handwriting is on the wall
for market definition.”23 However, “to this day, no one has advanced
anything better.”24 It is this gap that the current Article fills by developing an alternative method that can serve as the starting point for
antitrust analyses. Specifically, this Article suggests assessing the degree of substitutability on a snapshot of actual price-differentials. Similar to the existing methodology, the proposed process begins by
identifying which products are substitutes for the product on which
the analysis is focused.25 The method diverges from the current methodology at the second stage – the stage of assessing the degree of substitutability.26 Rather than determining this degree through a
hypothetical exercise, the proposed method identifies those products
that were sold for a price that is, and has been, within a close price
range to the price of the product in question. All products within a
price-range of 5% of the product in question—those that are clearly
the closest substitutes—are considered the relevant market for purposes of antitrust analyses. No more is required at the market definition stage.
To use an illustrative example, consider a hypothetical merger between Apple and Samsung. There are other smartphone manufacturers: Huawei, Nokia, and Motorola, to name a few. But what is the
market in which Apple and Samsung compete? Are they two of many
competitors in the overall smartphone market, or are they the only
two competitors in what consumers consider to be the high-end
smartphone market? Under the existing methodology, it is all but impossible to decide which of the two market definitions is correct. The
method suggested in this Article would do so swiftly. As will be
demonstrated, a quick search of smartphone manufacturers’ websites
vindicates intuition, according to which iPhones and Galaxy phones
constitute a separate market.27 Challenging Apple and Samsung’s hypothetical merger would become extremely simple.
The method developed in this Article exploits the understanding
that price differences between substitutes are a consequence of the
degree of substitutability. Substitutability can therefore be deduced
23. Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31,
33 (2014).
24. David Scheffman et al., Twenty Years of Merger Guidelines Enforcement at the FTC: An
Economic Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 282 (2003).
25. At times, the practice or merger under scrutiny may be relevant to a number of products,
and a ‘market’ must be identified for each product. This is no different from the application of
the current methodology.
26. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 8–11.
27. See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
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from such differences. Simply put, if the price of two functionally similar products is nearly the same, this indicates that the products are
close substitutes for each other. Conversely, if their prices are different, this indicates that they are not close substitutes.
The method developed in this Article overcomes both the theoretical shortcomings of the existing methodology and its practical deficiencies. It requires no percentage-price increase, so it can easily be
applied to products supplied for no monetary consideration, as is the
case for a host of products and services in the modern commercial
world—for example the products and services supplied by YouTube,
WhatsApp, Instagram, Facebook, and the like. The method is in line
with, and can help implement, the FTC’s updated policy seeking to
streamline antitrust challenges and make antitrust law more useful in
the modern economy.28
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: Part I elaborates on the role of market definition, its theoretical underpinnings,
and its importance. Part II elaborates on the shortcomings of the existing methodology and explains the need for an alternative. Part II
also shows that, to date, no alternative of general applicability is available. Part III develops an alternative method that can substitute for
market definition as a starting point for antitrust analyses. Part IV
explains how this alternative overcomes the shortcomings of market
definition. Part V then addresses two limitations of the method developed in this Article. A brief conclusion follows.
I. MARKET DEFINITION
A. The Role of Market Definition
Antitrust law’s focal point is market power – the power over price
and quantity.29 The key question in antitrust cases is whether the conduct in question has created, entrenched, or enhanced market power
or will create, entrench, or enhance market power.30 For practically all
28. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, FTC Rescinds 2015 Policy That Limited Its Enforcement Ability Under the FTC Act (July 1, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/07/ftcrescinds-2015-policy-limited-its-enforcement-ability-under.
29. See e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
116–117 (1993); Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 27
J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECONS. 617, 620 (1997).
30. See, e.g., E. Food Servs., Inc. v. Pontifical Cath. U. Servs. Ass’n, 357 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
2004). Cartelistic horizontal agreements such as price fixing are subject to a per se illegality rule
and thus do not require a comprehensive rule of reason analysis. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The
Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1058 (1979). But even in such cases one
must know if the agreeing parties are competitors, that is if the agreement is truly a horizontal
one. More importantly, per se illegality rules are the rare exception. See D. Daniel Sokol, The
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practices under scrutiny—mergers, tie-ins, vertical agreements, exclusivity arrangements, and so on—the question mandates a comprehensive analysis of the relevant market circumstances under the rule of
reason.31 And it is impossible to conduct such an analysis without first
assessing the market power of the firm (or firms) in question.
Market power is, however, practically impossible to measure directly. A key component of the formula expressing market power, the
Lerner Index, is marginal cost.32 And marginal cost is unmeasurable.33
The inability to assess market power directly has resulted in a focus on
market share as a proxy for market power,34 because there is a strong
positive correlation between a firm’s (or firms’) market share and its
(or their) market power.35 All else equal, the larger a firm’s market
share, the greater its market power; that is, the greater its control over
market price and quantity.36 The formal illustration of this correlation
is presented in the margin.37 The logic behind it is intuitive. When a
firm raises the price of its product, it earns more on units of the product it continues to sell. At the same time, it loses some sales, because
some customers discontinue purchases. Additionally, both existing
and potential competitors attempt to increase their output to meet the
now-unsatisfied demand. The firm raising the price gains from the increase in per-unit profits but loses from those sales that are no longer
made at the elevated price. The first effect is more pronounced the
Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, The Rule of Reason, and Per Se Legality,
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1011–12 (2014). On the justifications for per se illegality rules, see Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74
YALE L.J. 775, 783–805 (1965). But see Alan Grant & Chetan Sanghvi, The Economic Foundations and Implications of the Per Se Rule, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 92 (2021) (challenging the
justification for the rule).
31. See Woodcock, supra note 5, at 2100. On the evolution of the rule of reason and the scope
of the analysis conducted under this rule see Andrew I. Gavil & Steven C. Salop, Probability,
Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens in Antitrust Analysis: Revitalizing the Rule of Reason for
Exclusionary Conduct, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 2107, 2114–19 (2020).
32. The Lerner Index is given by L=P-MCMC, where P is price and MC is marginal cost. See
Kaplow, Market Definition, supra note 20, at 446.
33. See Crane, supra note 23, at 55. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700–13 (1975).
34. See Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CAL. L. REV. 3, 14–20 (1984).
35. See E. Food Servs., Inc. v Pontifical Cath. U. Servs. Ass’n, 357 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501 (1974). A formal illustration of this correlation is developed in William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 27 J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & ECONS. 493, 495 (1981).
37. The index for measuring market power, the Lerner Index, is expressed using the following
formula: L=P-MCMC= 1åf= Såd+ (1-S)år , where P is price, MC is marginal cost, åd is the
market elasticity of demand, åf is the firm’s elasticity of demand, S is the firm’s market share
(thereby making (1-S) competitors’ market share), and år is rivals’ elasticity of supply. Kaplow,
Market Definition, supra note 20, at 44.
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larger the firm’s market share is. The more sales a firm makes, the
more units it will continue to profit from. Conversely, the second effect is attenuated the larger the firm’s market share. Competitors’
ability to increase output has a smaller impact the smaller these competitors’ market share is.38
Therefore, the larger a firm’s market share, the more it gains from a
given price increase. There is thus a strong positive correlation between a firm’s market share and its market power. Due to the impossibility of measuring market power, market share serves as an
important proxy.
B. The Current Methodology
In order to estimate a firm’s (or firms’) market share, one must naturally first identify the market. The contours of the “market” are,
however, not bright line boundaries. Every product has many substitutes, some of which are close substitutes and some of which are distant substitutes. As the Canadian Competition Tribunal observed:
“One can conceptually think of a series of concentric areas whereby
as the price rises the radii lengthen.”39

The first step of the market share analysis is therefore identifying
the group of products that consumers consider close-enough substitutes for the product in question to be included in the “market” for
purposes of establishing market shares.40
It is here that the market definition methodology comes into play.
The technique employed is known as the SSNIP, an acronym for
“Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price.”41 The SSNIP
test, also referred to as the Hypothetical Monopoly Test, is designed
to assess the degree of substitutability between the product in question and its substitutes by looking at the net effect of a price-increase
on a firm’s profits.42 The smallest group of products being considered
as a standalone market is assumed to be controlled by a single manufacturer or seller (the hypothetical monopoly).43 Then, the adjudicator
38. Small existing competitors are often referred to as “the competitive fringe.” See, e.g.,
Janusz A. Ordover et al., Comment, Herfindahl Concentration, Rivalry, and Mergers, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1857 (1982).
39. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Hillsdown Holdings Ltd., Can LII
2092, 16 (1992).
40. . In formal economic terms, the endeavor is an attempt to measure a firm’s own demand
elasticity, although elasticity of demand if in fact determined not only by the competitive pressure exerted by close substitutes. See infra Part II.B.
41. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 8–9.
42. Kaplow, Market Definition, supra note 20, at 466.
43. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 8–9.
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asks whether this hypothetical monopoly would profit from imposing
a small but significant, non-transitory, price increase.44 The figure normally considered is a 5% increase.45 If the price increase would have
been profitable, the inference to be drawn is that relatively few consumers would have been lost to substitutes (because the loss would be
offset by the increased revenue from those consumers who continued
to purchase the product at elevated prices). This, in turn, implies that
the product in question is relatively isolated from competitive pressure exerted by substitutes, and can be regarded as a standalone market. If the opposite is true—that is, if the price increase would not
have been profitable—the implication is that a large number of consumers would have shifted demand to other products, which suggests
that there is a group of products that consumers consider to be close
substitutes for the product in question.46 When this is the case, the
closest group of substitutes is added into the market, and the test is
conducted again for the broadened group (or “market”). The exercise
is repeated until the price of the products included in the group can be
profitably raised by 5% for a non-transitory period (normally, one
year).47 The smallest group of products satisfying the SSNIP test is
defined as the product market.48 Once the product market has been
identified, the relevant firms’ market share becomes obvious, and an
initial assessment of market power becomes almost immediate.
In merger control, a second step must follow. Merger review is normally conducted before the merger has been consummated.49 Therefore, after the merging firms’ current degree of market power has
been determined, a second stage of predicting the merged firm’s postmerger market power must follow.50 At this stage, additional factors

44. Id.
45. Id. at 10.
46. Id. at 8.
47. Id. at 9.
48. Once the product market has been defined, antitrust authorities also consider the geographic area in which the producer competes. Id. § 4.1. This process is known as geographic
market definition. See id. § 4.2. Geographic market definition is beyond the scope of this
Article.
49. This is the case for all mergers that require pre-merger notification under the Hart, Scott,
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a; see FTC, WHAT IS THE PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM? AN OVERVIEW 1 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/attachments/premerger-introductory-guides/guide1.pdf.
50. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 487, 510 (1974); see also HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 1 (“Most merger analysis is necessarily predictive, requiring an assessment of what will likely happen if a merger proceeds as compared to what will
likely happen if it does not.”).
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that are not necessarily captured by market shares are considered.51
For example, rivals’ elasticity of supply—the speed and cost at which
competitors can divert means of production to satisfy unmet demand—is an important determinant of the competitive threat posed
by a merger.52 But pre-merger market power is nonetheless a key factor in the decision.
Incorporated in the 1982 version of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,53 market share has become the almost invariable starting point
of the analysis.54 In reality, market definition is much more than a
mere starting point. It is a key element of the analysis, and is often
determinative of the outcome, because it offers a persuasive (although
formally tentative) conclusion regarding market power.55 As the FTC
attempts to broaden the scope of antitrust law and apply it to address
types of conduct not under its traditional purview,56 he importance of
a quick understanding of the competitive situation increases.
II. THE SHORTCOMINGS

OF THE

METHODOLOGY

Market definition has always been challenging in real-life cases. A
decade ago, it was also proven illogical. The shortcomings of the
methodology are reviewed next.
A. The Impracticability of the Methodology
The first problem with the market definition methodology is that it
is impractical. The SSNIP test requires assuming a hypothetical price
increase imposed by a hypothetical monopoly and hypothesizing
about how different groups of consumers will respond to such a hypothetical price increase.57
51. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 41 U.S. at 522–27; United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc. 743 F.2d 976,
982–83 (1984).
52. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 36. Some have even suggested that defining
markets focusing solely on demand-side considerations and ignoring supply-side substitution is
erroneous. See Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1436 (9th Cir. 1995); Lantec,
Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1147 (D. Utah 2001); Nobody in Particular Presents,
Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’n., Inc., 311 F. Supp.2d 1048, 1087 (D. Colo. 2004).
53. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16.
54. In the context of merger analysis, it has even been argued that market definition is a
prerequisite, given the language of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914). See
Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Market Definition: An Introduction, 28 J. REPRINTS
FOR ANTITRUST. L. & ECONS. 3, 5 (1998); see also Lantec, supra note 43; Harris & Jorde, supra
note 34, at 4. On the evolution of merger analysis throughout the various revisions of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, see Scheffman et al., supra note 24, at 282–86.
55. On the determinative effect of the market-definition analysis and conclusion, see Crane,
supra note 23, at 69.
56. See supra notes 19–22.
57. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 4.1.2.
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In the abstract, the effects of a price increase are easy to predict:
some consumers will discontinue purchases, resulting in lost revenue.
And some consumers will continue to purchase the product, resulting
in increased per-unit profits. But what the SSNIP is geared at is determining which effect will outweigh the other. This determination requires approximating the size of each group with a large degree of
accuracy, an impractical task when the scenario considered is a hypothetical one. An attempt to assess the number of consumers that
would have shifted consumption in response to the price being hypothetically raised by a specific amount is little more than a guess.58
Theoretically, past experience may be revealing. One can look at
past price increases and learn of substitutability from consumers’ responses to those increases. But this possibility offers little relief. First,
the SSNIP test is often conducted in industries in which prices have
been relatively stable for long periods of time. And price fluctuations
that date long back are not indicative of the responses of contemporary consumers to similar price increases.
Second, even relatively recent price fluctuations will normally be of
little help. The SSNIP requires holding the price of all other products
constant.59 The reason is that the analysis attempts to measure the
competitive pressure exerted by substitutes.60 Past instances in which
both the price of the product being considered as the candidate market and the price of its substitutes changed are not helpful. For example, if the prices of apples and pears increased or decreased in the
past, this will tell the adjudicator little about their substitutability.
Only idiosyncratic price increases of the product in question are potentially useful. But such idiosyncratic price increases are unlikely absent a change in the competitive structure. Therefore, even recent
price fluctuations are not a helpful substitute for the SSNIP test.
The problem of the SSNIP test’s impracticability is further exacerbated by the fact that the benchmark against which the (hypothetical)
response to the (hypothetical) price increase is compared, is itself hypothetical. The benchmark for the SSNIP analysis is the competitive
price of the product in question; one must conduct the SSNIP test
assuming the price of the product was the competitive one, not its
actual price.61 Prevailing market prices already reflect any degree of
market power that is possessed by the seller or sellers of the product
58. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
59. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 4.1.1.
60. Id.
61. Ioannis Kokkoris, The Concept of Market Definition and the SSNIP Test in the Merger
Appraisal, 26 E.C.L.R. 209, 211–13 (2005).
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in question. At the extreme, if the product is sold by a monopoly,
prices will already be at their monopolistic level and any price increase, however trivial, will be unprofitable. In order to assess the degree to which the product in question is isolated from competition,
one must inquire whether or not it would have been possible to profitably raise its price by 5% from the competitive benchmark.62 But as
perfect competition is a theoretical construct,63 one cannot even approximate, let alone know, what the competitive price would have
been.
Finally, the hypothetical exercise is normally repeated more than
once. The exercise begins with the closest set of substitutes. But if the
SSNIP is not satisfied, the next-best substitute is added, and the exercise is repeated until the SSNIP has been met.64 This means conducting the test more than once.65 Repetition of the same hypothetical
process further exacerbates the problems associated with it.66
To add to the long-recognized practical issues associated with its
application, the SSNIP also suffers from a problem that is unique to
the analysis of digital economy markets—the problem of zero-price
markets. In the digital economy, many products are provided to consumers for no monetary consideration. Google’s search engine, Gmail,
YouTube, WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, for example,
all provide consumers with a product or service that consumers do not
directly pay for. To be sure, this does not mean that consumers are not
actually charged for the service. They pay by devoting attention and
time to advertisements or by allowing the service providers to obtain
personal data and information which is then used to target these consumers.67 But in terms of applying the SSNIP test, this creates an in62. Using actual market prices as the benchmark has come to be known as the “cellophane
fallacy”, following the ruling in United States v E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
395–96 (1956). See Kokkoris, supra note 61, at 211.
63. See EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A
RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 77–79 (7th ed. 1960).
64. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 9. Kaplow, Market Definition, supra
note 20, at 439.
65. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 4.1; Marc Remer & Frederick R.
Warren-Boulton, United States v. H&R Block: Market Definition in Court Since the 2010 Merger
Guideline, 59 ANTITRUST. BULL. 599, 602 (2014).
66. Robert H. Lande & James Langenfeld, From Surrogates to Stories: The Evolution of Federal Merger Policy, 11 ANTITRUST 5, 7 (1997); see also Paul Geroski & Rachel Griffith Identifying Antitrust Markets, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF COMPETITION 5–6 (2005). For an
illustrative example (in the context of summary judgment) see Nobody in Particular Presents,
Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’n., Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1081, 1084.
67. See generally Daniel G. Goldstein et al., The Economic and Cognitive Costs of Annoying
Display Advertisements, 51 J. MARKETING RES. 742 (2014); see also Rani Molla, The Cost of an
Ad-Free Internet: $35 More Per-Month, VOX (June 24, 2019), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/
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surmountable problem. As the price charged is zero, a 5% priceincrease is meaningless, so the SSNIP cannot be applied.68 Regardless
of the regular difficulty in applying it—a troubling issue in its own
right—the SSNIP is simply unsuitable for modern markets.
B. The Theoretical Shortcomings of the Methodology
In the previous Part, I have shown that the market definition methodology is impractical, certainly in modern markets. In this Part, I focus on its theoretical flaws. In a seminal article published in 2010,
Professor Kaplow established that the methodology is not a persuasive one even on a purely theoretical level.69 In fact, it is completely
illogical, and requires the equivalent of alchemy.70
To see why, it is helpful to begin with the correlation between market share and market power in the homogeneous goods’ markets. Homogeneous goods are goods that are viewed by consumers as perfect
substitutes for one another.71 For example, consumers might view different brands of oranges as identical for all purposes, or as extremely
similar. When homogeneous goods are considered, the formula expressing market power as a function of market share “yields the correct measure of market power without any need to engage in further
analysis of market definition, regardless of how many substitutes may
exist and how close some of the substitutes may be.”72 Market power
in the homogeneous goods’ market can therefore be derived from
market share with precision, if one knows rivals’ elasticity of supply
and market demand elasticity.73 Even if one does not know these elas6/24/18715421/internet-free-data-ads-cost. For an analysis of the value of attention see Day &
Stemler, supra note 8, at 8–10.
68. See DIGITAL REG. PLATFORM, Approach to Market Definition in a Digital Platform Environment (Aug. 26, 2020), https://digitalregulation.org/approach-to-market-definition-in-a-digitalplatform-environment/. A possible alternative would be to apply the SSNIP by (hypothetically)
increasing the amount of time consumers are forced to spend on watching commercials by five
percent or by increasing the amount of information collected by the service-providers by five
percent. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ROLE AND
MEASUREMENT OF QUALITY IN COMPETITION ANALYSIS 11–19 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/
competition/Quality-in-competition-analysis-2013.pdf [hereinafter OECD QUALITY REPORT]
Such tests are sometimes referred to as SSNDQ (Small but Significant Non-transitory Decrease
in Quality) tests. Id. at 14. But these alternatives are extremely impractical and are even more
complicated than the standard SSNIP. See id. at 9, 79; Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, The
Curious Case of Competition and Quality, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 227, 236 (2015).
69. See generally Kaplow, Market Definition, supra note 20.
70. Kaplow, Alchemy, supra note 20, at 915.
71. Kaplow, Market Definition, supra note 20, at 448.
72. Id. at 453, 458, 469.
73. Id. at 451–53.
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ticities, an initial appreciation of market power is immediate, because
market power is positively correlated to market share.74
However, the key feature of market definition is the move from the
homogeneous market to the heterogenous one (and subsequently, if
the SSNIP is not satisfied, to more heterogeneous candidate markets).75 At this stage, the market is redefined to include additional
products, which are—from consumers’ perspectives—more distant
substitutes than those previously considered. The move to the redefinition stage introduces three major problems that plague the analysis.
First, the move from a homogeneous product market setting to a
heterogeneous one is either redundant or impossible. As mentioned, if
one knew the market elasticity of demand and rivals’ elasticity of supply in the original (homogeneous goods’) market, one could infer the
firm’s own elasticity of demand directly, with no need for market definition.76 The firm’s market power in the heterogeneous goods’ market
is determined by its market share in this market, and by rivals’ elasticity of supply and market elasticity of demand in this market. The only
way to plug a number for these elasticities in the broadened market is
by using the original elasticities in the narrow market, adjusted to the
broader market.77 But had elasticities in the narrow market been
known, the whole endeavor would have been redundant, and the
firms’ market power could have been pinpointed with no need for
market redefinition. Put differently, to figure out what (market) demand elasticity and rivals’ supply elasticity in the new market are, one
must “undo” the broadening of the market. But if that were helpful,
there would have been no need to broaden the market in the first
place.
An example may be useful. Consider a carpenter who makes chairs.
If chairs are not a standalone market (the SSNIP is not satisfied), then
benches, the closest substitutes, are added into the market. In order to
assess the carpenter’s market power in the “chair-and-bench” market,
74. On the correlation see Kaplow, Market Definition, supra note 20, at 451–53.
75. Id. at 453.
76. This is because the firm’s own elasticity of demand, its market power, is insensitive to the
question of which products consumers switch to. This is shown in Kaplow’s expression (3). Id. at
450.
77. Formally, the Lerner Index in the broadened market is given by L=P-MCMC= 1åf= Sd+
(1-S)r, where S is the firm’s market share in the broadened market, d is the demand elasticity of
the broadened market, and r is rival’s supply elasticity in the broadened market. Kaplow, Market
Definition, supra note 20, at 455. These unknown values can be expressed in terms known from
the homogeneous market, but this requires adjusting the formulas to the homogeneous-goodsmarket formula (see Kaplow’s equation (6) for the new market elasticity of demand: d= SSåd,
and equation (7) for rival’s (new) supply elasticity: r=1-SS(1-s)sår), which is essentially undoing
the (re)definition process). Id. at 456.
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the court or the agency must know what demand for chairs and
benches is, and how quickly other carpenters can transfer means of
production to chairs and benches. If this is known for the “chairs”
market, broadening the market is redundant, because market power
could have already been established. If this is not known, then the
move to the heterogeneous “chairs-and-benches” market is
impossible.
A second problem with the methodology is that there is no standard
reference market. There is no specific level of market power associated with any specific market share. Even if a market has somehow
been properly defined, and a firm’s market share in that market has
been pinpointed, the inference with respect to market power is unclear. For example, what does a 75% market share imply in terms of
market power? Specific market shares must somehow be associated
with corresponding degrees of market power. A standard reference
market “must be shared if communication employing market share is
to enable common understanding.”78
Finally, there is no criterion for the choice of one market definition
over the other. Even assuming that some standard reference market
exists, different market definitions may over- or underestimate the
precise degree of market power. The adjudicator must then choose
between two (or more) candidate markets. The correct market is, of
course, the one that most accurately reflects the degree of market
power the firm possesses. But this implies that in order to choose between competing market definitions, the adjudicator must have some
preliminary idea of how much market power the firm in question has.
Suppose, for example, that the FTC is contemplating two different
market definitions. In one, the narrow market, a firm’s market share is
70%, which—according to the standard reference market we assume
has been put in place—indicates significant market power. When the
next-best substitute is brought in and the market is broadened, the
firm’s market share drops to 30%, which indicates insignificant market power.79 The FTC must then decide which of these market definitions is the correct one. The natural criterion for selection is the
degree to which each of the market shares reflects the firm’s market
power. But if market definition is chosen based on some preliminary
estimation (“guesstimation,” as it is termed by Kaplow) of market
power, then the methodology has merely brought the adjudicator

78. Kaplow, Market Definition, supra note 20, at 463.
79. The numeric example largely follows that presented in Kaplow. Id. at 462–65.
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back to this preliminary estimation. The whole process is a mere
tautology.
Moreover, if the firm’s precise market power corresponds to a 25%
market share or a 40% market share, the second candidate market
will still be chosen (because 30% approximates the firm’s market
power more accurately than 70%), but the estimation of market
power will not accurately reflect the firm’s market power. The market
will be defined as the second market, the firm’s market share in the
market will be found to be 30%, and its market power will be found to
be that associated with a 30% market share (according to the standard
reference market that we assume has somehow been put in place).
But the firm’s market power is actually greater or smaller (because by
assumption it corresponds to a 40% or 25% market share). Thus,
when the process is not a mere tautology, it is a worsening of the original guess.80
Based on these three critiques of market definition, Professor
Kaplow argued that the market definition process is logically flawed
and should never be undertaken.81 Professor Kaplow’s argument has
been subject to a debate, 82 but his key points remain unchallenged,
and it is now relatively clear that market definition is logically flawed.
And even if it is helpful as a very crude starting point,83 it is, as explained, impossible to employ in modern markets.
C. Potential Alternatives
In non-merger cases, an alternative to market definition, namely direct evidence, is sometimes available. When direct evidence of competitive harm is available, federal agencies and courts have been
willing to look at this evidence in lieu of the standard focus on market
definition.84
However, the “direct effects” alternative is unsatisfactory as a
method of general application. The different indicators of direct effects on competition suffer from a host of limitations which have been
surveyed by Professor Crane. It is helpful to briefly recapitulate this
account.85
80. Id. at 467.
81. Id. at 440, 502–06.
82. See Duncan Cameron et al., Good Riddance to Market Definition?, 57 ANTITRUST BULL
719, 719–20 (2012); Malcom B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, In Defense of Market Definition, 57
ANTITRUST. BULL. 667 (2012).
83. Coate & Simons, supra note 82, at 671.
84. James A. Keyte & Neal R. Stoll, “Markets - We Don’t Need No Stinking Markets!” The
FTC and Market Definition, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 593, 594 (2004).
85. Crane, supra note 23.
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The first potential indicator is profit margins. Theoretically, if a
firm’s profit margins are large, this indicates that it possesses market
power. But this option has only surface appeal. Slim profit margins do
not necessarily imply lack of market power, because monopoly profits
may be consumed internally by firms.86 And large margins do not necessarily indicate the existence of market power, mainly because firms
allocate (accounting) profits to specific products based on considerations entirely unrelated to competitive issues (such as tax considerations). Moreover, even if there was some objective way to measure
accounting profits, this would not be helpful because accounting profits are distinct from economic profits, which are the real indicator of
market power.87
The Lerner Index mentioned earlier,88 is, as explained, practically
impossible to employ, as one of its two determinants—marginal
cost—is never known in real life.89 Additionally, from an economic
perspective, large (economic) profits may be perfectly compatible
with competition and may reflect what are known as Ricardian rents
rather than monopoly rents.90
Price discrimination could also theoretically be indicative of market
power, as market power is a prerequisite for price discrimination. But
all sellers have some market power, so the question becomes one of
degree. And in real life, price discrimination is weakly correlated, if at
all, with the degree of market power, and is consequently of little probative value.91 Control over prices does not do any better, as essentially all real-life sellers have some control over prices. As no products
are perfectly homogeneous, equating control over price with market
power “would impose a fantastical construct on antitrust enforcement
in differentiated goods markets.”92
Ultimately, “at present, direct proof of market power is a basket of
broken or incomplete tools.”93
In the context of merger control, direct evidence is even less likely
to be helpful. The reason is that when dealing with mergers, the agen86. Id. at 54.
87. Id. at 54–56.
88. Ordover et al., supra note 38.
89. Crane, supra note 23, at 56. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 33, at 700–13.
90. Crane, supra note 23, at 57. Ricardian rents are attributable to the fact that marginal cost
increases as quantity increases. Therefore, even when price equals marginal cost, as in the theoretical setting of perfect competition, the profit on the pre-marginal units is positive. A firm
under perfect competition may well show significant rents on its balance sheet.
91. Id. at 60.
92. Id. at 61.
93. Id. at 34.
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cies normally scrutinize the merger before it is consummated.94
Merger control is designed to “interdict competitive problems in their
incipiency. . . .”95 Direct evidence of the future effects of a merger is,
by definition, nonexistent. When the merger under scrutiny is a consummated merger (if the merger was not one that required premerger
notification), evidence may theoretically exist of its actual anti-competitive effect.96 But in the typical merger-review case direct evidence
is not a viable option.97
Alternatives to market definition are thus either a basket of incomplete tools (in non-merger cases) or not even that (in merger cases). If
antitrust law is to be effective against tech-giants and in the digital
economy, certainly if its scope is to be broadened,98 it cannot afford a
starting point which is either an easily contestable, impractical methodology or a basket of broken tools. Antitrust law requires a simple
starting point of general applicability. The next Part proposes such a
starting point.
III. MARKET PREDEFINITION
In the previous Parts it has been shown that antitrust law is in dire
need of an alternative for market definition. This Part provides such
an alternative, referred to as “market predefinition.”
A. The Basic Method
The market predefinition method proposed here is simple: much
like the existing methodology, it begins with the product (or products)
to which the practice or merger is relevant. But rather than trying to
hypothetically raise the price of the product in question by 5%, the
process looks at actual market prices.99 All substitutes, the price of
94. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 11.
95. Id. at 1.
96. Id. at 3. Theoretically, the opposite is also true. If a consummated merger has not brought
about an increase in price, this suggests that it is competitively benign. However, in such cases
the evidence is far less compelling because the merging parties may have been aware of the
possibility of review. See Scott A. Sher, Closed But Not Forgotten: Government Review of Consummated Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 41, 68 (2004):
[M]erging parties cannot simply rely on the non-occurrence of competitive harm after
an acquisition’s close to establish conclusively that a merger is free from section 7 concerns. The non-existence of such evidence could simply result from the company’s conscious decision to forestall raising prices, reducing output, or affecting innovation while
the government is reviewing the merger.
Id.
97. Keyte & Stoll, supra note 84, at 625–31; Remer & Warren-Boulton, supra note 65, at 602.
98. Supra notes 19–22.
99. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 10.
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which is within a 5% “radius” of the price of the product in question—whether higher or lower—are considered to be the “market”
for a finding of market share (and a prima facie finding of market
power). This completes the process.
In order to see how a snapshot of price differences accomplishes all
that is needed, it is helpful to think of what brings about a price difference between substitutes. Clearly, substitutes are priced differently
because consumers, as a group, value them differently. And when substitutes are priced similarly it is because consumers view them as very
close substitutes for one another. If products are perfect substitutes
for each other, their prices will necessarily be identical. Conversely, if
a product is, from consumers’ perspectives, inferior to its substitutes,
its producers will be forced to lower its price, and the product will be
priced differently from its substitutes. Actual prices of substitutes are
the consequence of the degree of substitutability, and thus every market has, in fact, already spontaneously applied the SSNIP. If the price
of a product is 5% higher than the price of the closest substitutes for
that product, this itself is conclusive proof that the product is a
standalone market; that is, that the competitive pressure exerted by
substitutes is not significant enough to have constrained a 5% price
increase. Had the traditional SSNIP test been applied to the group of
(homogeneous) products using the competitive price as a benchmark,
a standalone market would have been found. A 5% price “radius”
thus defines the homogeneous market.100
Before explaining how the proposed method overcomes market
definition’s deficiencies, it is helpful to return to our intuitive response
to the Apple-Samsung merger. This time, however, with information
about the actual price of smartphones. When Apple launched the
iPhone 11 Pro for sale in February 2020, its price on Apple’s website
was $1379.101 On the same date, Samsung offered its equivalent
smartphone, Galaxy S20, for a price of $1320.102 The price difference
between the two models is in the tune of 4%, undoubtedly a trivial
100. As a technical-economic point, products are not perfectly homogeneous if their price is
not identical. But even if there are very slight differences in consumers’ perceptions of the products leading to a trivial price difference, for all practical purposes the products may be treated as
homogeneous. See Coate & Simons, supra note 82, at 679, 684, 694 (“The literal truth of the
homogeneity assumption is much less important than whether the simplification aids in the development of accurate economic analysis. In effect, if the competitive process behaves ‘as if’ the
market is homogeneous, then the assumption is scientifically useful.”). See also Crane, supra
note 23, at 49; Cameron et al., supra note 82, at 734 (both making a similar point).
101. APPLE, PRODUCTS (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.apple.com/ca/shop/buy-iphone/iphone11-pro.
102. SAMSUNG, PRODUCTS (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.samsung.com/ca/smartphones/galaxys20/buy/.
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difference. By contrast, on the same date Huawei’s leading model, the
P30, was offered for $949, or 69% of the price of an iPhone. Motorola
and Nokia’s leading models were priced at less than half of the price
of an iPhone. Thus, it becomes crystal clear that iPhone and Galaxy
compete vigorously between themselves, but consumers do not view
other smartphones as close substitutes for either of them.
Like traditional market definition, the market predefinition method
is insensitive to the reason for the price difference. There may be various reasons for why other substitutes are priced at significantly different prices – costs of production, differences in branding, or any other
reason. But this does not matter for purposes of the analysis, that focuses on consumers’ perspectives. 103
The key advantage of the proposed method is that it is based on an
ex post analysis. It focuses on how the degree of substitution between
different products has shaped the market prior to the point at which
the analysis is conducted. It is this feature of the method that characterizes it as market predefinition. Importantly, there is never any need
to redefine markets. Hypothetical markets need not be broadened,
and the introduction of additional products into the market is unnecessary. As will be recalled, this is the stage of the market definition
methodology that is illogical. This is also the stage that is problematic
in modern zero-price markets. The proposed method is both logical
and easily employed in modern markets.
B. Application of the Method
One potential problem with looking at actual prices is that these
may be manipulated by interested parties. By raising or lowering
prices prior to scrutiny, parties may be able to become part of a “market,” thereby creating the impression that their market shares are
smaller than they actually are. This is especially concerning in the
merger context. Merging firms know well in advance that they will be
under scrutiny and can even control when they will be under scrutiny.104 They may find it profitable to forgo profits (by raising or lowering prices) for a limited period of time in order to secure approval of
the merger. For example, in our hypothetical Apple-Samsung merger,
Apple and Samsung may lower the prices of their smartphones for a
limited period in order to appear to be part of the broader
103. See, e.g., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 7 (“Market definition
focuses solely on demand substitution factors.”).
104. The merging firms can control when the merger will be under scrutiny, because scrutiny
begins with the filing of Merger Notices. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; see also Sher,
supra note 96, at 52–56.
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smartphone market. Similarly, non-merging entities who have a stake
in the approval or disapproval of the merger—buyers, sellers, and
competitors—may also strategically alter their conduct when review
of the merger is anticipated.105
It is therefore important to ensure that the price-differential snapshot is taken at a point in time in which enquiry was not yet envisaged.
At the same time, it is important not to look too far back. Markets are
dynamic, and the degree of substitutability between different products
and brands changes over time. Price differentials dating back may thus
be misleading. The precise period of time that is appropriate depends
on a host of variables and is therefore case-sensitive. For example,
when a merger is a strategic one and is of great importance from the
merging firms’ perspective, it can be assumed that it had been contemplated for quite some time, and that the merging parties were willing
to incur a loss for a relatively long period. This would generally justify
looking at an earlier point in time. Conversely, when the market is a
very dynamic one, a shorter period of time may be justified. As a rule
of thumb, it seems reasonable to suggest a one-year look-back, echoing the Merger Guidelines’ one-year period for market definition.106
As a supplementary measure, it will be helpful to verify that the
snapshot is of representative price differentials. Focusing on a single
point in time introduces the risk that one has looked at atypical prices.
This may be the case not only because prices were manipulated in
anticipation of antitrust scrutiny, but also due to business dynamics.
For example, the brand in question may have been offered for a timelimited discount, and so on. To safeguard against such errors, it is
helpful to look at other points in time as well, to verify that the price
differentials used are representative. Importantly, this does not suggest that one should use weighted averages of price differentials, apply
convoluted formulas, or review price trends.107 It is simply a way of
verifying that the snapshot is not completely off mark. The price differential used for applying the method is a single price differential –
the difference observed one year before scrutiny. Earlier price differentials function only as a safety measure to verify its suitability. Using
the smartphone example once again, a quick look at the prices of previous models when these were launched will provide all the necessary
105. Although this is probably less of a concern. Non-merging parties are not always aware of
the merger early enough to manipulate prices, and they have less control over when the merger
is scrutinized. Additionally, non-merging parties do not capture the full benefits from preventing
mergers, as these are shared by all buyers or sellers, so non-merging individuals and corporations
are under-incentivized to act.
106. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 9.
107. On the problem of relying on price trends, see Crane, supra note 23, at 61–62, 64.
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information. Even if price differences were slightly greater or smaller
than those identified in February 2020, the most recent differences
may be used.
C. Different Products Within the Same Cluster
The proposed method does not imply that all products in a cluster
are close substitutes for all other products in the cluster. The market
predefinition will depend on the product from which the analysis begins. Products A and C may both be close substitutes for product B,
but not for one another. Consider, for example, a hypothetical market
for cars, the price of which is presented in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1: MARKET
Brand
A
B
C
D

FOR

DIFFERENT BRANDS

OF

CARS

Price
$9,400
$9,000
$8,600
$8,200

Each of the cars will, under the market predefinition method, be
found to be a close substitute for the cars directly above it and directly
under it in the table. But although cars A and C are both considered
part of the market for purpose of calculating manufacturer B’s market
share (because both are within a 5% price-range of car B), car A will
not be part of the market for purposes of establishing manufacturer
C’s market share, and vice versa. The “market” thus changes depending on the starting point of the analysis.
But this is not an error. It is simply a reflection of the competitive
reality, and a consequence of the fact that unlike the traditional methodology, the method proposed here does not ask an abstract question
(“what is the market?”), but rather one that centers on a specific
product (“what are the closest substitutes for the product”). Cars A
and C are both close substitutes for car B. But they are not close substitutes for one another.
***
I now turn to evaluate the method proposed here against the flaws
identified in the market definition methodology (Part IV). Subsequently, in Part V, I address two potential objections to the proposed
method. First, I address the possibility that two products are priced
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similarly by sheer coincidence. Second, I address the possibility that
the competitive pressure is exerted by more distant substitutes. For
example, a luxurious car may exert significant competitive pressure on
a simple car, even though it is priced at twice the price of the simple
car.
IV. MARKET PREDEFINITION

AND

MARKET DEFINITION

In previous Parts, the shortcomings of the existing methodology
were reviewed, and the market predefinition method was proposed. I
now turn to show that both the impracticability of traditional market
definition and the methodology’s theoretical shortcomings are overcome by the method advocated in this Article.
A. The Practical Advantages of the Proposed Method
The first advantage of the proposed method is its simplicity. All that
is required is information regarding actual prices. The data are readily
available and inexpensive to obtain, and once they have been – no
complicated formulae are required. The smartphone case provides a
useful example. A brief review of the different smartphone manufacturers’ websites suffices for an understanding of the “market”.
A second, arguably more important, practical advantage of the proposed method, is that it can easily be applied to zero-price products.
Many digital-economy markets are such markets, and the traditional
methodology cannot be applied to these markets because a 5% priceincrease is meaningless if the price is zero. Thus, for example, although Google holds a share of approximately 90% of search-engine
usage,108 the question of whether this is a standalone market in which
Google has a monopoly has yet to be resolved under the current
methodology.109 Under the proposed method, all search engines that
charge consumers nothing are considered close substitutes for the purpose of market definition.110 Nothing more is required, and Google is
easily (and swiftly) identified as a monopoly.
108. STATCOUNTER, Search Engine Market Share United States of America, https://
gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/all/united-states-of-america/#monthly-202102202202 (last visited May 7, 2022).
109. As early as 2012, the agencies were contemplating taking action against Google. See Marcus Wohlsen & Michael V. Copeland, Feds Move Closer to Suing Google Over Search, WIRED
(Oct. 13, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/10/google-gets-closer-to-a-court-date. But the question of whether or not Google has a monopoly it is using to inhibit competition proved to be an
extremely difficult one. See also Indig, supra note 10.
110. For such an implicit view outside the context of market definition, see Maurice E. Stucke
& Ariel Ezrachi, When Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at Search Engines, 18
YALE J.L. & TECH. 70, 78 (2016).
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An extreme case illustrating the advantages of the proposed
method is the case in which the product is isolated from competition,
but price-pressure comes from the possibility of discontinuing
purchases altogether. Suppose that if prices are raised significantly,
consumers (or a large subset of consumers) will turn to savings rather
than to substitutes. Even if we assume the Hypothetical Monopoly
Test suffers from no practical difficulties in application, it will result in
a never-ending process. A small but significant non-transitory increase
in the price of the smallest group of products will be unprofitable (because a price increase will result in many lost consumers that shifted
to savings). This will result in the next-best substitute being added into
the market. When applying the SSNIP to the broadened candidate
market, two outcomes are possible: the SSNIP may be profitable, or
unprofitable. The SSNIP will be profitable if the second product constitutes a standalone market (although it is not a substitute for the
first). If this is the case, the two products together will be found to
constitute a single market, although they are not. The Hypothetical
Monopoly test will produce an error. The second possible outcome is
that the SSNIP will be unprofitable in the new candidate market as
well. The Hypothetical Monopoly Test will be repeated indefinitely.111
By contrast, the proposed method will offer a correct understanding
of the competitive reality. The product in question has no close substitutes because it commands a premium of 5% or more over its closest
substitutes.
B. The Theoretical Shortcomings of the Traditional Methodology
The proposed method is clearly more practical than the current
methodology. It is also applicable to modern markets. Importantly,
the method also overcomes the key theoretical shortcomings of the
market definition methodology.
As will be recalled, the first flaw in the market definition methodology is the shift from the homogeneous goods’ market to the heterogeneous goods’ market, and the need to essentially “undo” the
redefinition.
The market predefinition method developed in this Article is not
susceptible to this flaw, because it focuses on the homogeneous market alone, without ever trying to broaden the market in any sense. In
the homogeneous goods’ setting, the formula expressing market
111. Or until enough products have been brought into the market to offset the loss incurred
due to the increase in the original product’s price.
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power as a function of market share yields the correct result.112 Even
if not all other variables are known, the positive correlation between
market share and market power allows for an inference of market
power.113 For example, even if rivals’ elasticity of supply cannot be
pinpointed, the firm in question is likely to possess market power even
if it has a large market share. Even if competitors can divert some of
their production capacity to meet unsatisfied demand in case of a
price increase, this is not likely to change much if their market share is
small.
The suggested method also overcomes Professor Kaplow’s third
criticism of the market definition methodology, namely that the
choice between different possible market definitions cannot be made
unless the adjudicator already has some sense of what the correct market is.114 As will be recalled, the market definition methodology essentially requires inferring market power from market share, while
simultaneously inferring market share from market power.115
This “chicken-egg” problem is eliminated under the proposed
method. The proposed method is actually a process of observing the
results of a natural experiment – attempting to deduce from actual
price behavior, settled spontaneously by the competitive forces, which
products are considered by consumers to be homogeneous to the
product in question. Market share is derived from a “market” that is
revealed, not defined. There is no choice between alternatives because
there can never be alternatives.
Professor Kaplow’s last criticism of the market definition methodology is, as will be recalled, that no standard reference market, or
agreed “conversion table,” exists. 116
This critique does not challenge the method advocated in this Article. First, as previously mentioned, Professor Kaplow’s point is not
that a common conversion table cannot be created, but that it should.
Indeed, both processes—traditional market definition and the market
predefinition method advocated in this Article—require a conversion
table. Such a table should be adopted by regulatory agencies. But this
does not challenge the core issue, which is the correlation between
market power and market share. It simply calls for a clear conversion
table to be put in place. This is a regulatory-administrative point
rather than a challenge to the substance of the method.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Supra note 73.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
Kaplow, Market Definition, supra note 20, at 467–71.
See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
Kaplow, Market Definition, supra note 20, at 462–65.
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Second, the conversion problem is irrelevant to the stage at which
the method advocated in this Article is applied. Market shares must
first be identified. Then, market power may be inferred. The method
proposed in this Article focuses only on the first stage. Before an inference can be drawn, whether through the use of a standard reference market or by other means, one first needs a method through
which market share can be assessed at all.
In this respect, the method proposed here is markedly different
from market definition. Traditional market definition requires a conversion table for the choice between candidate markets.117 It thus requires a conversion table as part of the process of assessing market
shares. By contrast, the method proposed in this Article requires no
choice between candidate markets. It focuses on revealing the firm’s
market share. It therefore does not require a conversion table to accomplish its role.
Of course, none of this suggests that a conversion table is not important. It undoubtedly is, if only for the sake of predictability. But
the lack of a conversion table is not material to the method proposed
here.
The conversion table espoused by the federal agencies—the DOJ
and the FTC—need not be identical to the table adopted by other
global agencies. As long as the conversion table provides predictability (and correlates market power to market share), it will function
properly. Therefore, suggesting a universal conversion table is beyond
the scope of this Article. Yet, it is helpful to note that there is no need
for an elaborate table identifying the degree of market power that is
associated with every conceivable market share. Thresholds are often
used in various contexts in antitrust law.118 In the current context, it is
sufficient to have a table in which market shares are divided into five
different categories. Market shares of up to 20% are assigned a value
of one. Market shares of between 20% to 40% are assigned a value of
two, and so on. A value of four to five will invoke a presumption of
117. Id.
118. For example, threshold figures of concentration levels that raise concern are used in
merger control. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 19. Thresholds have
also been put in place in the context of premerger notifications. See FTC, supra note 49, at 2–5.
Threshold figures are also used to assess the competitive concerns emanating from exclusivity.
See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 282 (3d Cir. 2012); Kentucky v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 191 F. Supp. 3d 694, 701–02 (W.D. Ky. 2016); McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783
F.3d 814, 837 (11th Cir. 2015); Omega Envtl. Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.
1997). Thresholds are also employed in the context of tying arrangements. See Jefferson Par.
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984); see also HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 534–35 (5th ed. 2016).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-3\DPL308.txt

792

unknown

Seq: 28

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

2-AUG-22

16:50

[Vol. 71:765

market power, whereas values of one or two will give rise to the opposite presumption.119
Regardless of the ease with which the standard reference market
can be devised, the key point is that the need for such a conversion
table does not challenge the method developed in this Article. In fact,
the method proposed in this Article is a prerequisite for such a table,
because market shares must be identified before they can be converted to market power values.
***
The market predefinition method thus overcomes both the practical
and the theoretical shortcomings of the traditional market definition
methodology. It is also easily applicable to modern markets.
When market shares are extreme, the market predefinition process
can be not only the starting point of the analysis, but also its end.
Specifically, when the firm in question is found to possess a trivial
market share within the “market” of close substitutes, very little additional information will be required. Conversely, Google’s contention
that “[c]ompetition is always one click away”120 should be viewed
skeptically given Google’s near 90% market share. When market
shares are not extreme, the method can accomplish market definition’s traditional role. It can serve as the standard starting point for
the market power inquiry.
V. CHALLENGES

TO THE

PROPOSED METHOD

Two potential challenges to the method proposed in this Article
render discussion. First, the method may wrongfully include products
in the “market” because their price happens to be similar to the price
of the product in question. Second, the method may ostensibly underestimate the competitive pressure exerted by distant substitutes. These
two potential challenges are addressed next.
A. Wrongful Findings of Insignificant Market Power
One type of error that may seemingly be brought about by the market predefinition method is a false identification of close substitutes,
resulting in a false-negative finding of insignificant market power.
119. The corresponding market power values may also be expressed in Lerner Index units,
and the categories may be adapted accordingly.
120. David Wismer, Google’s Larry Page: “Competition Is One Click Away” (and Other
Quotes of the Week), FORBES (Oct. 14, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidwismer/2012/10/
14/googles-larry-page-competition-is-one-click-away-and-other-quotes-of-the-week/
?sh=3a6b31c65ea1.
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Specifically, this may happen when prices of products which are mistaken for close substitutes are similar by coincidence. Consider, for
example, a toothbrush brand that is priced at $2. The adjudicator mistakenly considers dental floss picks to be substitutes for toothbrushes.
When looking at the price of dental floss picks, a brand is identified
that is priced at, say, $1.95. This will lead the adjudicator to wrongfully
regard the dental floss picks as close substitutes for toothbrushes and
include them in the market. Consequently, the market share of the
toothbrush manufacturers (who are the focus of the analysis) will be
found to be much smaller than it actually is.
But past experience teaches us that this is not a real problem. If
identifying which products are substitutes for the product in question
were a real-life problem, it would have surfaced under the application
of traditional market definition. Recall that under the existing market
definition methodology, the adjudicator gradually broadens the market, including the next set of substitutes at each stage. The adjudicator
must therefore know which substitutes are closer than others (as opposed to how close they are, which is what the methodology aims to
gauge).121 In nearly forty years of application, this element of the process has not proved challenging or prone to error. In practice, the federal agencies and courts identify substitutes and competitors
whenever the methodology is applied.122 This identification is regularly informed by conversations with consumers, producers and other
market participants.123 And a look at the functionality of the products
being considered is often helpful.124 If in forty years courts and experts have not found it problematic to map which substitutes are
closer than others, they should have little difficulty in identifying
which products are substitutes at all.125
B. Wrongful Findings of Significant Market Power
The second possible challenge to the proposed method is that it
may underestimate the degree of competitive pressure exerted by distant substitutes. Products that are priced far above or well below the
product in question may limit a firm’s market power. If a court underestimates the competitive pressure exerted by distant substitutes, it
121. Kaplow does not contest this assumption. See Kaplow, Alchemy, supra note 20, at 945.
But he notes that the question of how the closest substitute is to be defined is set aside. Id.
122. See, e.g., Geroski & Griffith, supra note 66, at 295.
123. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 4 (“The most common sources of
reasonably available and reliable evidence are the merging parties, customers, other industry
participants, and industry observers.”).
124. For an early case, see Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 235 (1962).
125. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 4, 7.
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will overestimate the firm’s market power, resulting in a false-positive
finding of market power.
Returning to the smartphone example, although Apple and Samsung smartphones are homogeneous for all practical purposes, and although each firm’s market share in the homogenous goods’ market is
significant (50% on average), other smartphones may exert competitive pressure on both companies’ smartphones. Consumers are willing
to pay a significant premium for Apple and Samsung smartphones.
But they will not pay any premium. If a merger between Apple and
Samsung is allowed and the merged firm attempts to raise the price of
its smartphones, consumers may switch to other brands. The difference in quality (real or perceived) may not justify the greater price
gap.
This, however, is not an objection to the method itself, but rather a
cautionary note on the inferences to be drawn regarding the future
from the current competitive state. It is, of course, possible that a distant substitute exerts competitive pressure (or that several distant substitutes jointly exert significant pressure) on the producer of the
product in question. But this does not make them close substitutes. As
should be clear to the reader, the object of the method at this stage is
not to substitute for the full competitive analysis conducted under the
rule of reason or to conclude the inquiry. The final outcome will depend on additional factors and on the specific elements that need to
be considered under each of the relevant statutes. Rather, the object
of the method at this stage is to generate an understanding of the current market reality and an appreciation of the varying degrees of substitutability. And in this respect, it is absolutely correct to deduce that
products that are priced differently are not close substitutes.
For some practices under review, an understanding of the current
competitive reality will suffice for an appreciation of the firm’s or
firms’ market position. Practices such as exclusive dealing, tied selling,
and loyalty discounts—all practices the legitimacy of which depends
on the share of the market impacted by the practice126—require no
inquiry into the future conduct of the firm engaging in the practice.
126. On the importance of the foreclosed market share for the analysis of exclusivity agreements and tying arrangements, see supra note 118. On the importance of the market share affected by loyalty discounts for the analysis of their legitimacy see Willard K. Tom et al.,
Anticompetitive Aspects of Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67
ANTITRUST L. J. 615, 636–38 (2000); Andrew Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies for
Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 3, 9–10 (2004); Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal—Why Aspen and Kodak
Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 659, 664 (2001).
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The requisite understanding of the firm’s current standing may be
dealt with swiftly.
In merger control, the analysis is forward looking. The current competitive state is thus one element of the competitive landscape. But in
this setting too, an understanding of the current market forces is a
necessary starting point.
It is also important to note that the structure of the process will also
safeguard against wrongful findings of market power. If a distant substitute indeed exerts competitive pressure, the merging firms will be
well aware of this. And it is in their interest to draw attention to factors that negate the presumption of market power. If Motorola
smartphones limit the ability of Samsung and Apple to raise the prices
of their smartphones, both Samsung and Apple should be able to present market analyses, surveys, and the like showing that this is the
case. Consequently, the possibility that such competitive pressure will
ultimately be overlooked in the process seems highly unlikely.
As a practical rule, if market shares are found to be trivial or even
small, a refutable presumption of no competitive danger may be applied. Objectors would then need to proffer evidence suggesting that
the firms in question would acquire some post-merger control over
price and quantity despite their small market shares. If the merging
firms’ (joint) market share is extremely large, a presumption of harm
to competition can be set, requiring the merging firms to produce evidence to the contrary. Using the conversion table previously suggested, mergers of firms with a joint market share producing a
corresponding market-power value of one or two should be presumed
competitively benign. And mergers of firms with a four or five score
on the market power index justify a presumption of injury to competition. In both cases, the proposed method offers a quick understanding
of the current competitive state, and a prima facie appreciation of
whether the merger is injurious to competition.127
Ultimately, the proposed method offers all that is needed if the relevant question is the firm’s (or firms’) current market position. In
merger control, a second step of predicting future outcomes is inevitable (as it is under the current methodology). But even in this setting,
the proposed method provides a crucial starting point. And it may
also be used to establish a prima facie conclusion.

127. The focus here is on the unilateral effects of the merger. Merger may also produce coordinated effects, captured by HHI values. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 16,
at 24–26. The analysis is equally applicable to coordinated effects.
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***
Neither the possibility of false negative findings of insignificant
market power nor the possibility of false positive findings of significant market power challenge the proposed method. The possibility
that products which are not close substitutes will wrongfully be considered close substitutes is implausible. It is theoretically possible
under any method but it has not proven to be a problem. The possibility that distant substitutes exert significant competitive pressure is not
to be dismissed. But it does not undermine the proposed method.
When the relevant question is the current market position of the firms
in question, the method provides an understanding of the current
competitive reality. In merger review cases, the method accomplishes
the first step—an understanding of the current competitive reality. At
the second stage geared at evaluating post-merger outcomes, courts’
attention can be expected to be drawn to additional evidence, if required, either through an institutional mechanism (burden-shifting) or
by mere power of the merging parties’ incentives.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust theory and practice are in dire need of some method that
will serve as a starting point for the market power analysis, most specifically in modern digital markets. This Article shows that much can
be achieved with no radical changes to antitrust law’s basic goals or
other extreme legislative amendments. The Article puts forward a
substitute for market definition, that can easily be adopted by agencies and courts. This alternative starting point is a quick, simple, and
cost-effective method of understanding the actual competitive reality
as it has been shaped by market forces.
The method will allow antitrust law to achieve its modern role of
combatting tech-giants and addressing competitive issues in the digital
economy, which it cannot do under the existing methodology.
The market predefinition method can be swiftly implemented,
thereby streamlining the application of antitrust law, and remediating
its failure in modern markets. The method will also increase predictability and significantly lower the costs of antitrust enforcement.

